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ON VAGUE ESCHATOLOGY
Michael J. Almeida

Ted Sider's Proportionality o f Justice condition requires that any two moral
agents instantiating nearly the same moral state be treated in nearly the same
way. I provide a countermodel in supervaluation semantics to the proportion
ality of justice condition. It is possible that moral agents S and S' are in nearly
the same moral state, S' is beyond all redemption and S is not. It is consistent
with perfect justice then that moral agents that are not beyond redemption go
determinately to heaven and moral agents that are beyond all redemption go
determinately to hell. I conclude that moral agents that are in nearly the same
moral state may be treated in very unequal ways.

Introduction
It's a familiar eschatological view that there are people in each possible
state in the afterlife. Some people go determinately and eternally to heaven
and some people go determinately and eternally to hell. And everyone
that goes to purgatory will eventually go determinately and eternally to
heaven. The familiar eschatological view rejects the doctrine of universalism. According to universalism all are ultimately redeemed to enjoy eter
nal communion with God. Universalism ensures that no human beings
are beyond redemption; every human being (or perhaps every being that
can go to heaven) does go to heaven.
Suppose that an essentially perfectly just being must select a princi
ple of justice that will provide the basis for evaluating the lives of moral
agents. The principle of justice will provide the moral justification for the
distribution of punishments and rewards in the afterlife. Since we have
assumed that universalism is false, an adequate principle of justice must
provide a moral justification for distributing punishments and rewards
in such a way that some people go determinately and eternally to heaven
and some people go determinately and eternally to hell.
In section (2) I consider Ted Sider's Degree o f Goodness Argument. The
argument assumes that the goodness and badness of moral agents is a
matter of degree. For each moral state that an agent might instantiate,
there is another moral state he might instantiate that is nearly the same
in value. The argument also advances a formal proportionality condition
on principles of justice. The condition requires that any two moral agents
instantiating nearly the same moral state be treated in nearly the same
way. Call that the proportionality o f justice condition.
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Among other things the proportionality of justice condition demands
that rewards and punishments in the afterlife be proportionate to the
goodness or badness of moral agents. In particular any two moral agents
instantiating nearly the same moral state should receive nearly the same
punishment or reward. But, according to the Degree o f Goodness Argument,
no principle of justice that observes the proportionality of justice and the
degrees of goodness among moral agents could distribute rewards and
punishments in such a way that some people go determinately and eter
nally to heaven and some people go determinately and eternally to hell.
We must therefore abandon the familiar eschatological view.1
In section (3) I generalize Sider's Degree of Goodness Argument. In section
(4) I offer a countermodel in supervaluation semantics to the proportional
ity of justice condition. It is not a requirement of justice that moral agents
that are in nearly the same moral states be treated in nearly the same way.
It is possible that there is an important and non-arbitrary moral difference
between moral agents instantiating nearly the same moral state. It is pos
sible, for instance, that moral agents S and S' are in nearly the same moral
state, S' is beyond redemption and S is not.2 I conclude that moral agents
in nearly the same moral state may be treated in very unequal ways.3
In (5) I consider the possibility that only those moral agents that reject
God as their savior are beyond redemption. I offer the Degree o f Acceptance
argument against the proportionality of justice condition. In (6) I consider
an objection from higher-order vagueness. I argue that we should reject the
proportionality of justice condition in favor of the Moral Difference Thesis
and the Vague Depravity Thesis. I offer some concluding remarks in (7).
The Degree o f Goodness Argument
According to Ted Sider any adequate principle of justice must meet the
proportionality of justice condition. Here is Sider.
[J]ustice requires its judgments to be proportional to the [morally
relevant] factors. If Sally's performance is better than Jimmy's then,
other things being equal, it would of course be unjust to pay Jimmy
more; but if Sally's performance is only minutely better than Jimmy's, it
would be unjust to pay Sally far more. . . . What I am calling the propor
tionality o f justice prohibits very unequal treatment o f persons who are very
similar in relevant respects.4
The proposed condition on principles of justice is a purely formal condi
tion. Compare, for instance, the proportionality condition in (J).
J.

For any moral agents S and S', if S and S' are the exactly same in ev
ery morally relevant respect, then S and S' should be treated in the
same way.

The condition in (J) demands that moral agents that share every property
relevant to the distribution of benefits and burdens must be treated the
same way. The condition in (J) is typically regarded as an uncontroversial
constraint on every substantive principle of justice from utilitarian prin
ciples to libertarian principles to liberal egalitarian or Rawlsian principles.
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The properties relevant to the proper distribution of benefits and burdens
might include utility-maximization, need, effort, merit or simply choice.
Moral agents that are exactly the same with respect to the relevant proper
ties, whatever those properties happen to be, must be treated in morally
equivalent ways.5
The proportionality of justice condition that Sider describes applies to
moral agents that are nearly the same in morally relevant respects. Consider
the conditions in (J').
J'. For any moral agents S and S', if S is not definitely morally worse
than S', then S and S' should not be treated in very unequal ways.
(J') is also proposed as a perfectly general constraint on principles of jus
tice. According to the condition in (J'), if S is not clearly morally worse
than S', then S and S' should not be treated in very unequal ways.
In the Degree of Goodness Argument, the moral states of individual agents
alone determine the proper distribution of punishments and rewards
among those agents. A principle of justice meeting Sider's proportion
ality of justice condition must distribute punishments and rewards to
moral agents in proportion to the degree of goodness or badness of their
moral states.
The degree of goodness or badness of each moral state an agent might
instantiate is determined by the number and kind of actions the agent per
forms. Suppose the degree of badness of each moral state is a simple mat
ter of the number of minor offenses a moral agent has committed. Here is
Sider's Degree o f Goodness Argument.
Suppose . . . that the divine criterion is based on how many obsceni
ties one utters (the more the worse). Suppose further that there are
no gaps in realized obscenity levels, in that for no n is it the case that
someone utters n obscenities, someone utters some greater number
of obscenities, and no one utters n +1 obscenities. . . . Now choose
some arbitrarily damned person, who on Earth uttered some num
ber n of obscenities, and begin going through the afterlife, finding
persons that were less and less obscene. Initially these persons will
all be in hell, but eventually we will arrive at one in heaven. In fact
there must be a sharp cutoff point in this procedure . . . . This is a
consequence of (i) the lack of gaps in realized obscenity levels (ii) the
binary conception of the afterlife and (iii) . . . that obscenity is a moral
matter of degree . . . . But such a cutoff would be monstrous, for it
would blatantly violate the proportional nature of justice. . . . [N]o
just God could give radically different treatment to a pair of persons
who differed only by a single obscenity.6
The repugnant conclusion of the Degree of Goodness Argument is that the
first moral agent S' to go determinately and eternally to hell will have ut
tered n +1 obscenities and the last moral agent S to go determinately and
eternally to heaven will have uttered n obscenities.
It's obvious that S and S' are treated in very unequal ways. S is go
ing determinately to heaven and S' is going determinately to hell. But S'
has committed just one more minor offense than S, so S' is not definitely
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worse than S. We have a clear violation of the proportionality of justice
condition. If S' is not definitely worse than S, then no principle of justice
can recommend that S' go determinately to hell and S go determinately
to heaven.
It is worth noting that not having such a cutoff would be at least as
monstrous. Assume for reductio ad absurdum that, for all moral agents
S and S', if S utters n obscenities and S' utters n - 1 obscenities, then S
goes determinately and eternally to hell only if S' goes determinately and
eternally to hell. If the degree of badness of each moral state is a simple
matter of the number of minor offenses a moral agent has committed and
non-universalism is true, as we have assumed, then there is some number
of obscenities n such that any agent that utters n obscenities goes determi
nately and eternally to hell. By hypothesis, for any n such that anyone who
utters n obscenities goes determinately and eternally to hell only if anyone
who utters n - 1 obscenities goes determinately and eternally to hell. By
repeated applications of the hypothesis we can conclude that everyone
goes determinately and eternally to hell. So having no cutoff is at least as
monstrous as having some cutoff.
According to the Degree of Goodness Argument the predicates 'being in
hell' and 'being in heaven' are not vague. It is not possible to be indeter
minately in heaven or to be indeterminately in hell. But the argument also
assumes that, for every possible moral state, some agent instantiates that
moral state in the afterlife. If there are moral agents in heaven and hell,
then there is very good reason to conclude that the proportionality condi
tion in (J') has been violated.7
Degree o f Goodness Argument Generalized
The Degree of Goodness Argument generalizes to any sequence of minor
evil actions that determines the degree of goodness or badness of moral
agents. The obscenity criterion is no more than a useful expository device.
Sider observes that it's not central to the argument.
No one would seriously propose obscenity as the divine criterion,
but the argument generalizes to apply to more realistic proposals.
Choose any moral matter of degree you like: number of charitable do
nations made, number of hungry fed, naked clothed or feet washed,
number of random acts of kindness performed, or even some amal
gam of several factors.8
Let k0be among the best moral states a human being might attain.9Let k be
among the worst moral states a human being might attain. The argument
urges that there is a sequence S of moral states kn (k0 < kn < k) such that,
for some increment in evil i (i > 0), no moral state k^^ is definitely worse
than the preceding moral state kni and the moral state k is much worse
than k0.10
The Degree o f Goodness Argument assumes that there are moral agents
instantiating every moral state in the sequence.11 Moral agents that instan
tiate the moral state k0go determinately and eternally to heaven and moral
agents that instantiate the moral state k go determinately and eternally
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to hell. If we let << symbolize 'much worse than' and let ~ symbolize 'not
definitely worse than,' the sequence S is described as follows.
S = k. ~ k„ , k,. ~ k. , L. ~ k,. , . . , k ~ k . & k << k„
It is assumed that there are increments (or decrements) insignificant
enough that the moral state k{n+1)l resulting from having committed n + 1
minor evils is not definitely worse than the moral state kmresulting from
having committed n minor evils. The assumption that there are insignifi
cant evils is not intended to commit us to the controversial position that
there are unnoticeable evils or imperceptible increments in pain or suffer
ing. The assumption does commit us to the plausible position that there
are minor evils.
According to the proportionality of justice condition in (J') any two
moral agents S and S' in adjacent moral states k(n+1)t and kmmust be treated
in nearly the same way. We know that moral agents instantiating k go de
terminately and eternally to hell. But we also know that there is some first
moral agent in the sequence that goes to heaven. As we move from k down
the sequence toward the best moral state in k0 there is some kn (k0 < kn < k)
such that moral agents instantiating the moral state k(n+1)i go determinately
and eternally to hell and moral agents instantiating the moral state in kni
go determinately and eternally to heaven.
But the recommendation that moral agents instantiating moral state kni
go determinately to heaven and moral agents instantiating the moral state
k(n1)i go determinately to hell violates the proportionality of justice condi
tion (J'). Contrary to (j'), there are two moral agents instantiating adjacent
moral states k(n+1)t and kmthat are treated in very unequal ways.
Irredeemable Evil and Supervaluationism
The Degree of Goodness Argument shows that any principle of justice avail
able to God that respects degrees of goodness and badness among moral
agents will violate the proportionality condition in (J'). But consider whether
principles of justice are in general required to meet the condition in (J').
Suppose that an agent S instantiates an irredeemably evil moral state
km if and only if S is himself irredeemably evil.12 And suppose a moral state
k is irredeemably evil if and only if k is sufficiently bad that God cannot
save any agent that instantiates kni.13
It is impossible, then, that S instantiates an irredeemably evil moral
state and also goes determinately to heaven.14 Given the binary conception
of the afterlife—that every agent goes determinately to heaven or goes
determinately to hell—a moral agent S is irredeemably evil only if S goes
determinately and eternally to hell.15 Let's stipulate finally that only those
moral agents that are beyond redemption go determinately and eternally
to hell. Every moral agent that is not irredeemably evil goes determinately
and eternally to heaven.16
Suppose that some moral agent S' is not definitely worse than moral
agent S. We can assume that S instantiates the moral state kni and S'
instantiates the adjacent moral state k(n+1)i in the sequence S. The open
question is whether it is possible that S' is irredeemably evil and S is not
irredeemably evil. The question is whether there might be an important
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and non-arbitrary moral difference between moral agents that instantiate
adjacent moral states.17
Notice that the predicates 'is morally worse than' and 'is irredeemably
evil' do not sharply divide their positive and negative extensions. Given
the assumption of non-universalism and the assumption that only those
beyond redemption go determinately to hell, we know there is a moral
state k ni that is redeemably evil and another moral state kmi that is irredeemably evil.18 And since these predicates do not sharply divide their
positive and negative extensions, there are many moral states in the se
quence that are neither redeemably evil nor irredeemably evil. There are
also moral states in the sequence k and k such that the moral state k
is clearly morally worse than the moral state km. But there are many moral
states such that k is not clearly morally worse than k .
On supervaluation semantics the truth-value of the proposition "the
moral state kmi is morally worse than the moral state kni" can be determined
only if we sharpen the vague predicate 'is morally worse than.' But there is
no unique and non-arbitrary way to make the predicate 'is morally worse
than' precise. Supervaluationism therefore makes it true that the moral
state k is morally worse than the moral state k if and only if that proposi
tion is true on every admissible precisification of 'is morally worse than.'
And supervaluationism makes it false that the moral state k is morally
worse than kni if and only if that proposition is false on every admissible
precisification of that predicate. Otherwise the proposition is neither true
nor false.
Supervaluation semantics places some important restrictions on ad
missible precisifications. The most important restrictions to consider here
concern the penumbral connections holding between the predicates 'is ir
redeemably evil' and 'is morally worse than.' The penumbral connections
in P and P', for instance, seem true.
P. For all n, m and for any i, kmi is irredeemably evil and kni is redeemably evil only if k mi is morally worse than kni.
P'. For all n, m and for any i, kmi is irredeemably evil and kni is not irredeemably evil only if k is not morally worse than k .
So there are no admissible precisifications of these predicates on which the
antecedents of these conditionals are true and the consequents are false.
But the Degree of Goodness Argument assumes in addition that P'' is true.
P''. For all n, m and for any i, k is irredeemably evil and k is not irre
deemably evil only if k is definitely morally worse than k .
If S is irredeemably evil and S' is not irredeemably evil then there is an im
portant and non-arbitrary moral difference between S and S'. But if there
is an important and non-arbitrary moral difference between moral agents
S and S', then according to P'', S and S' cannot be in adjacent moral states
k(n+1)i and km. In other words, if there is an important and non-arbitrary
moral difference between moral agents S and S', then S and S' cannot be in
nearly the same moral state.
But the penumbral connection in P'' is mistaken. It is possible that moral
agents S and S' are in adjacent moral states k( n+1)t and km, and also that there
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is an important and non-arbitrary moral difference between S and S'. Sup
pose k(n+1)i is definitely irredeemably evil and kmis not definitely irredeem
ably evil. It might also be true that k
is not definitely morally worse than
km. Consider figure (1) in which both predicates are depicted.
Not Morally Worse than kni

|----------- -"
k
|---------

Morally Worse than kni

- i - i ------------ 1
k ni k(n+1)i
k
|--|------------ |

Redeemably Evil

Irredeemably Evil

Fig. 1

In figure (1) the moral state k(n+1)i is in the shaded area on the top line.
Moral states to the left of the shaded area are definitely not morally worse
than kmand moral states to the right of the shaded area are definitely mor
ally worse than k . Since the moral state k
is in the shaded area on the
top line, it is not definitely morally worse than kn. But on the bottom line
the moral state k(n+1)i is not in the shaded area and the moral state kni is in
the shaded area. So the moral state k(n+1)i is definitely irredeemably evil and
kni is not definitely irredeemably evil.
Let's show that the situation depicted in figure (1) is possible. As we
move incrementally up the sequence of moral states from k0 to k there is
some small increment i (i > 0) such that moral agents instantiating moral
state k(n+1)i are definitely irredeemably evil and moral agents instantiating
kni are not definitely irredeemably evil. Moral agents instantiating kni are
borderline irredeemably evil. And since we have assumed that moral agents
might be in nearly the same moral states, it is possible to choose an incre
ment i (i > 0) sufficiently small that the state k(n+1)i is not definitely morally
worse than that state kni. Moral agents instantiating k(n+1)i are in nearly the
same moral state as moral agents instantiating kni. But then for some incre
ment i (i > 0) in the sequence S, k(n+1)i is definitely irredeemably evil and kni
is borderline irredeemably evil, and k t is not definitely worse than km.
This is the situation depicted in figure (l).
According to the Degree of Goodness Argument every moral state in se
quence S is instantiated. There is therefore some moral agent S that instan
tiates the moral state in kni and some moral agent S' that instantiates the
moral state in k{n+1).- The moral agent S' is definitely irredeemably evil and
moral agent S is borderline irredeemably evil. Suppose an essentially per
fectly just being applied the following principles of justice to S and S'.19
PJ1. Moral agents that are definitely irredeemably evil cannot be saved
and so must go determinately and eternally to hell.
PJ2. Moral agents that are borderline irredeemably evil can be saved
and so go determinately to heaven.
On the basis of principle PJ1, the agent S' goes determinately and eternally
to hell and on the basis of PJ2 the agent S goes determinately and eternally
to heaven.
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It is true that S' is not definitely morally worse than S. But there is none
theless an important and non-arbitrary moral difference between S and
S'. S' is definitely irredeemably evil and so S' cannot be saved. But S is
borderline irredeemably evil and so S can be saved.
We should conclude that the proportionality of justice condition in J' is
false. It does not in general violate the proportionality of justice not to treat
S and S' in nearly the same way even when S' is not definitely worse than
S. If S is borderline irredeemably evil and S' is definitely irredeemably evil,
then S' is not definitely worse than S, but it is not possible to treat S and S'
in nearly the same way. S' is definitely beyond redemption and cannot be
saved; S is not definitely beyond redemption and can be saved.
What about Degrees of Acceptance?
Suppose it is true that no moral agent that does not reject God as his sav
ior—no matter how many obscenities he has uttered during his lifetime—is
beyond redemption. The Degree o f Goodness Argument assumes that there
is some number of obscenities n such that anyone uttering n obscenities
goes determinately and eternally to hell. We are assuming instead that
only those moral agents that reject God as savior go determinately and
eternally to hell.
Let's suppose that God provides every moral agent with a final op
portunity to accept or reject him as his savior. There are of course vari
ous more or less definite ways to reject God as savior. Perhaps Smith is
asked whether he accepts God as his savior and Smith indefinitely shakes
his head no, or Smith is asked whether he accepts God as his savior and
he indefinitely utters 'no.' In order to simplify matters let's suppose that
moral agents are provided with a sequence of cards on which there are
various shades from definitely red to definitely orange. Suppose agents are
instructed to hold up the card that is definitely red if they definitely reject
God as their savior. Moral agents are instructed to hold up a card that is
indefinitely red if they indefinitely reject God as savior.20 In general moral
agents are more indefinite in their rejection of God as the cards they hold
up are less definitely red. Finally moral agents are instructed to hold up
the definitely orange card to definitely accept God as their savior.
Now suppose an essentially perfectly just being applies the following
principles of justice to S and S'.
PJ3. Every moral agent that definitely rejects God as his savior cannot
be saved and so goes determinately and eternally to hell.
PJ4. Every moral agent that does not definitely reject God as his savior
can be saved and so goes determinately and eternally to heaven.
Essentially perfectly just beings that apply PJ3 and PJ4 send moral agents
determinately and eternally to hell only if they definitely reject God as their
savior. Moral agents that do not definitely reject God as their savior are sent
to heaven. We assume that everyone knows that only those moral agents
that definitely reject God as their savior are sent determinately and eternally
to hell. And everyone knows that every moral agent that does not definitely
reject God as their savior is sent determinately and eternally to heaven.
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Assume that for every card in the sequence there is some moral agent
that holds up that card. There will be a card fc
that is definitely red and
a card kni that is just a shade different and not definitely red. Every moral
agent that holds up kmgoes determinately and eternally to heaven and ev
ery moral agent that holds up card k
goes determinately and eternally
to hell. So there will be moral agents S and S' such that, S definitely rejects
God as his savior and S' does not definitely reject God as his savior, and
the card S holds up is not definitely more red than the card S' holds up.
S is sent determinately and eternally to hell because S definitely rejects
God as his savior and cannot be saved. S' is not sent determinately and
eternally to hell because S' does not definitely reject God as his savior and
can be saved. The card S holds up is not definitely more red than the card
S' holds up, so the attitude that S expresses is not definitely worse than
the attitude that S' expresses. But there is an important and non-arbitrary
moral difference between S and S'. The important moral difference is that
S definitely rejects God as his savior and cannot be saved and S' is on the
borderline of rejecting God as his savior and can be saved.
Degrees o f Goodness and Higher-Order Vagueness
Let's consider an important objection from higher-order vagueness that
there cannot be an important and non-arbitrary difference between moral
agents instantiating adjacent moral states km and k . It is true that there
is a borderline between the redeemably evil and the irredeemably evil.
The borderline cases include all of the indefinitely irredeemably evil
moral states. But there is yet another, second-order, borderline between
the definitely irredeemably evil and the indefinitely irredeemably evil. The
borderline cases include all of the indefinitely definitely irredeemably evil
moral states. Figure (1) depicts the first-order borderline but fails to depict
the second-order borderline.21
We have been supposing that there are very small increments in evil.
But if increments in evil are sufficiently small and kni and k(n+1)i are adjacent
moral states, then the moral state k(n+1)i would be on the second-order borderline of irredeemable evil. But if k(n+1)i is on the second-order borderline
of irredeemable evil, then there is no important and non-arbitrary moral
distinction between moral states kmand k , +1)t. Any two moral agents S and
S' that instantiate the moral states k m and k(n+1)i are such that both agents are
borderline irredeemable evil. S is on the first-order borderline and S' is
on the second-order borderline. The difference between S and S', in short,
is that S is definitely, indefinitely irredeemably evil and S' is indefinitely,
definitely irredeemably evil.
The situation is depicted in figure (2) where we show both first-order
and second-order borderlines.
kn
0

kni . (n
k.+1)ii1v

k

I--------------------------I--I-------------1

Redeemably Evil

Irredeemably Evil

Fig. 2
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The darker shaded region of figure (2) includes those moral sta tes-in cluding the moral state kni—that are definitely, indefinitely irredeemably
evil. The lighter shaded region to the right includes those moral sta tes-in cluding the moral state k - that are indefinitely, definitely irredeemably
evil. And the unshaded region to the further right are all of those moral
states that are definitely, definitely irredeemably evil. Since both S and S'
are borderline irredeemably evil, there is no important and non-arbitrary
moral difference between them. But then, contrary to the argument so far,
S and S' cannot be treated in very unequal ways. The proportionality of
justice condition is therefore not falsified.
The right response to the objection from higher-order vagueness is to
note that, by hypothesis, every moral state in the sequence is instantiated.
So again there will be some moral agents S and S' such that S' is not defi
nitely morally worse than S and such that there is an important and non
arbitrary moral difference between S and S'. Consider figure (3).
kn
0

ki . (n
L+1)ii1v
n

k

I------------------------------I--I-------------1

Redeemably Evil

Irredeemably Evil

Fig. 3

Let S' instantiate the moral state k )i that is clearly in the unshaded region
to the right. S' is not on any borderline-neither a first-order nor second
order borderline—of irredeemable evil. S' is definitely, definitely irre
deemably evil and so S' cannot be saved.22
Let S instantiate the moral state k ni. S is on the borderline—in this case
a second-order borderline—of irredeemable evil. Specifically S is indefi
nitely, definitely irredeemably evil. But S is nonetheless on the borderline
of irredeemable evil and so he is not beyond the possibility of redemption.
He is instead almost beyond the possibility of redemption.
So, we arrive again at our previous conclusion. S' is not definitely mor
ally worse than S but there remains an important and non-arbitrary moral
difference between S' and S that justifies treating S' and S in very unequal
ways. S' is among the irredeemably evil and S is on the borderline of the
irredeemably evil.
Of course the objection from second-order vagueness arises again at
the third order of vagueness and so on upward. But the response to the
problem of second-order vagueness can be generalized. Let's define super
definite irredeemable evil in SE.
SE. Moral agent S is superdefinitely irredeemably evil if and only if for
every order of vagueness n, it is true that S is definitelyn irredeem
ably evil.
A moral agent S is superdefinitely irredeemably evil, then, just in case S
is irredeemably evil and S is not on any borderline of irredeemable evil. So,
for a simpler formulation of (SE) consider the equivalent (SE').
SE'. Moral agent S is superdefinitely irredeemably evil if and only if S
is irredeemably evil and S is not borderline irredeemably evil.
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In figures (1) and (3), for instance, the moral state k
is not on any bor
derline of irredeemable evil and so k( is not only definitely irredeem
ably evil but superdefinitely irredeemably evil as well. The important and
non-arbitrary moral difference between agents S and S', then, is that S is
on some borderline or other of irredeemable evil and S' is superdefinitely
irredeemably evil.
The claim that there is an important and non-arbitrary moral difference
between S and S' does not commit us to the position that there is a precise
border between moral agents that are not irredeemably evil and moral
agents that are irredeemably evil. The claim that there is an important and
non-arbitrary moral difference between S and S' commits us instead to the
Vague Depravity Thesis and the Moral Difference Thesis. Here is the Vague
Depravity Thesis
There is no moral state kn, (k > kn> k0) in S such that for every increment
i (i > 0) and every admissible precisification, kni is not irredeemably evil
and k(n+1)i i is irredeemably evil.23
The Vague Depravity Thesis ensures that, for all moral states kn and k(n+1),
there is some i (i > 0) and some admissible precisification such that a moral
agent that instantiates k(n+1)i is irredeemably evil only if a moral agent that
instantiates k is also irredeemably evil. So there is no discrete transition
from a moral state that is indefinitely irredeemably evil to a moral state
that is definitely irredeemably evil. And in general there is also no discrete
transition between a moral state that is indefinitely definitelyn irredeem
ably evil to a moral state that is definitely irredeemably evil.
The claim that there is an important and non-arbitrary moral difference
between S and S' also commits us to the Moral Difference Thesis.
If there is some moral state k , (k > k > k ) in S such that for some
increment i (i > 0), k(n+1)i is irredeemably evil on every admissible precisification and kni is not irredeemably evil on some admissible precisification, then it is not in general unjust that moral agents instantiating
k(n+1)i are treated very differently from moral agents instantiating kni.
The Moral Difference Thesis asserts that there might be an important and
non-arbitrary moral difference between moral agents that instantiate
nearly the same moral state. It might be that every moral agent that is
superdefinitely irredeemably evil cannot be saved and every moral agent
on the borderline of irredeemable evil is not quite beyond redemption.
Finally the view that there is an important and non-arbitrary moral dif
ference between S and S' commits us to the rejection of the proportional
ity of justice thesis. The proportionality of justice thesis entails that any
two moral agents instantiating adjacent moral states must be treated in
nearly the same way. The proportionality of justice thesis assumes that
there cannot be an important and non-arbitrary moral difference between
moral agents that instantiate nearly the same moral state. It assumes, for
instance, that it's impossible that a moral agent instantiating k ^ y is irre
deemably evil and cannot be saved and a moral agent instantiating kni is
borderline irredeemably evil and so can be saved. But we have found that
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this assumption is mistaken. We should conclude instead that the propor
tionality of justice thesis is false. It is not in general unjust to treat moral
agents that instantiate nearly the same moral state in very unequal ways.
Conclusions
The Degree o f Goodness Argument shows that any principle of justice that
respects degree of goodness among moral agents will violate the propor
tionality condition in (J'). But the proportionality condition in (J') is false.
There can be important and non-arbitrary moral differences between
moral agents that instantiate nearly the same moral state. And those im
portant moral differences can justify very unequal treatment.
The Vague Depravity Thesis ensures that there is no precise border be
tween moral agents that are irredeemably evil and moral agents that are
not irredeemably evil. There is no discrete transition, for instance, from a
moral state that is definitely irredeemably evil to a moral state that is in
definitely irredeemably evil. A moral agent that instantiates a moral state
that is irredeemably evil might not be much worse than a moral agent that
instantiates a moral state that is not irredeemably evil.
According to the Moral Difference Thesis there can be an important and
non-arbitrary moral difference between moral agents that instantiate
nearly the same moral states. It might be, for instance, that all and only
moral agents that are superdefinitely irredeemably evil cannot be saved.
And it might also be that moral agents that are on some borderline of ir
redeemable evil are, fortunately, not quite beyond redemption. Together
these theses entail that the proportionality of justice condition is false.
Suppose we find it reasonable to reject the proportionality of justice
condition in (J').24 The right eschatology might then entail that every moral
agent is either sent determinately to heaven or sent determinately to hell.
And a perfectly just being might respect the degrees of goodness among
moral agents in the distribution of these rewards and punishments.25
University o f Texas at San Antonio

NOTES
1. We could abandon the degrees of goodness assumption instead, but it
seems close to certain that moral states come in degrees.
2. A metaphor might help clarify this claim. Think of evil moral states in
spatial terms, the worse the moral state the lower the spatial location. There
might be two moral agents instantiating moral states that are at nearly the
same spatial location, and one agent might be just out of God's reach while the
other might be just within God's reach.
3. Let me emphasize that I'm not claiming that it's true that some agents
are beyond redemption and others are not. I'm claiming rather that it is pos
sible that some agents are beyond redemption in the sense described and oth
ers are not.
4. See Theodore Sider, “Hell and Vagueness," Faith and Philosophy 19
(2002), p. 59, my emphasis.
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5. It is worth noting in passing that principles of justice on which indi
vidual choice is relevant to determining the distribution of benefits and bur
dens already raise interesting and important worries for Sider's alleged viola
tions of the proportionality of justice. Robert Nozick famously urged that any
principle of justice sensitive to individual property rights would observe the
maxim: to each as they are chosen and from each as they choose. If Sally plays
only slightly better than Jimmy, then on Nozick's view, it does not violate the
proportionality of justice if you choose to give Sally all of your multi-million
dollar inheritance for her playing and choose to give Jimmy none. See Robert
Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, Inc. 1974) p. 160ff.
Even setting aside libertarian conceptions of justice, most see no injustice in
the fact that the winner of a 100 meter dash might be highly rewarded while
the fourth place finisher receives next to nothing. And that does not seem un
just even if the fourth place finisher is just .002 seconds behind the winner.
6. Theodore Sider, “Hell and Vagueness," pp. 59-60
7. The Degree of Goodness Argument is not based on any epistemological
assumptions. The repugnant conclusion is that any principle of justice that
might be used to distribute rewards and punishments must violate some pro
portionality condition. A moral agent S uttering n obscenities goes determi
nately to heaven and a moral agent S' uttering n +1 obscenities goes deter
minately to hell. The injustice Sider notes is not that S' did not know that the
punishment for uttering n + 1 obscenities was eternal damnation. The injustice
is not that moral agents do not know which principles of justice are being
applied to them. To simplify matters let's assume that everyone knows that
anyone that utters n + 1 obscenities is eternally damned and anyone that utters
n obscenities goes to heaven. To simplify further let's assume that every agent
knows how many obscenities he has uttered.
8. Theodore Sider, “Hell and Vagueness," p. 60. It is important that the
problem Sider discussion generalizes to more realistic criteria. As one referee
for this journal mentioned, the quantitative obscenity criterion is obviously
implausible in view of typical non-quantitative models of sin.
9. Of course there might be no best or worst moral state. If so then assume
that moral state k0 is so good that any moral agent that instantiates k0 goes
determinately and eternally to heaven and the moral state k is so bad that any
moral agent that instantiates k goes determinately and eternally to hell.
10. In decision-theory the symbol e is often used to represent some very
small increment. I use instead the variable i to represent some small increment
in evil; I use ni to represent (n x i) evils; and I use kni to represent the moral
state resulting from having committed (n x i) evils. Assuming we can measure
the size and number of small evils, n is some positive integer and i is some
small real value.
11. Strictly, the Degree of Goodness Argument assumes that it is possible that
moral agents instantiate every moral state in the sequence, not that moral
agents actually instantiate every moral state in the sequence. Sider notes,
Suppose further that there are no “gaps" in realized obscenity levels,
in that for no n is it the case that someone utters n obscenities, someone
utters some greater number of obscenities, but no one utters n + 1 ob
scenities. (This assumption is arguably harmless, for we may focus our
attention on some possible world in which it holds . . .). pp. 59-60
12. A referee urged that, for all we know, “God's unlimited grace would
guarantee that no moral state kni is sufficiently bad that an agent instantiat
ing kni is beyond redemption." Call that the redemption assumption. If the
redemption assumption is both true and inconsistent with Sider's assumption
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of non-universalism, then Sider's argument is unsound. I'm happy with that
conclusion. But the redemption assumption might well be consistent with
non-universalism. Suppose it is true that every moral agent that does not reject
God as savior—no matter how bad her moral state—is thereby saved and
no moral agent that rejects God as savior—no matter how good her moral
state—can be saved. It is then true that no moral state k is sufficiently bad
that any agent that instantiates kni is beyond redemption and also true that
moral agents that freely reject God as savior cannot be saved. I consider this
possibility in section 5.
13. A referee suggested a definition of redeemable moral states along these
lines.
R. A moral state kni of an agent S is redeemable if and only if there is a world
w and agent S' that instantiate kni in w and S' goes to heaven in w.
(R) raises interesting questions concerning whether agents that are redeem
able relative to one divine criterion C consistent with God's perfect justice are
also redeemable relative to any other criterion C' consistent with God's perfect
justice. According to (R), an agent S instantiating kni is redeemable just in case
there is some world w at which some criterion C consistent with God's perfect
justice obtains, some agent S' instantiates kni, and S' goes to heaven. But sup
pose criterion C' actually obtains rather than C? I would (tentatively) advance
an alternative analysis of redeemable evil that is relativized to a criterion C
consistent with God's perfect justice.
I. A moral state kni of an agent S is redeemable relative to a criterion C con
sistent with God's perfect justice if and only if there is some world w at
which C obtains, an agent S' instantiates kni in w and S' goes to heaven.
14. There is a complex relationship between the possibility of middle
knowledge and the possibility of irredeemably evil moral agents. As I under
stand suggestions from Clayton Littlejohn and Luke Gelinas (in discussion),
they each urge that if T is the largest state of affairs that God can strongly ac
tualize, then if (i) God knows that, were he to actualize T, I would freely harm
someone and (ii) God actualizes T anyway, then (iii) God is at least partially
blameworthy for the harm produced. One might urge further that I am not
entirely to blame for my resulting moral state. I'm unpersuaded in either case.
God does not seem blameworthy, for instance, if he could not have failed to
actualize T without weakly actualizing a world that was less-than-the-best
(weakly) actualizable. But I concede that a full discussion of this and related
problems would require at least another paper.
15. There are theological concerns about when S instantiates an irredeem
ably evil moral state. If S instantiates an irredeemably evil moral state before
the time of judgment, then perhaps S is not beyond the possibility of redemp
tion. We are assuming that, possibly, there is a point at which any agent that
instantiates an irredeemably evil moral state is beyond redemption.
16. A referee suggested that the assumption that God has divine control
over the criterion of justice might be inconsistent with any moral agent being
irredeemably evil. On divine control Sider notes,
Divine control: God is in control of the institution of divine judgment, in
control of the mechanism or criterion that determines who goes to Heav
en and who goes to Hell. This is not to say that God is solely responsible
for the fate of created beings, for the divinely mandated criterion might
contain a role for free choices. Nor is it to say that God is vindictive. The
requirement makes no assumptions about the nature of the criterion,
beyond that it is in God's control. (p. 58)

ON VAGUE ESCHATOLOGY

373

And a little further down he adds,
Divine control requires that God be in control of the criterion determin
ing these populations [i.e., the populations of heaven and hell], and thus
that God's choice of a criterion be consistent with his attributes. The cri
terion of judgment must therefore cohere with his perfect justice. (p. 58)
The assumption of divine control must be consistent with Sider's assumption
of non-universalism and God's perfect justice. According to these assumptions,
it is consistent with God's perfect justice that some moral agents are sent de
terminately and eternally to hell. We can make these assumptions consistent
if those agents that are sent determinately and eternally to hell are those God
cannot, consistent with his justice, save. These agents I call irredeemably evil.
But if no agents are irredeemably evil, then given the assumption of non-universalism, some redeemable moral agents are nonetheless sent determinately
and eternally to hell. Those agents must have some other property that makes
them worthy of eternal damnation. I consider this possibility in section 5 on
degrees of acceptance. Perhaps those redeemable agents freely choose to reject
God as their savior or to reject his grace. As I show in section 5, the problem for
the Degree of Goodness Argument re-arises.
17. A referee suggested that the property of being irredeemably evil might
not be vague. It might be true that there is some moral state kni such that agents
instantiating kni are definitely redeemably evil and, for any i (i > 0), agents
instantiating k(n+1)i are definitely irredeemably evil. If that is true then it con
stitutes a decisive objection against Sider's Degree of Goodness Argument. The
objection entails that there is an important and non-arbitrary moral difference
between agents that instantiate k . and agents that instantiate k(n+1)., for any
i (i > 0), that justifies God in sending the former to heaven and the latter to
hell. This would be a faster route to my conclusion. My assumption that the
property of being irredeemably evil is vague concedes to Sider that uttering
one minor obscenity cannot change an agent from being definitely redeem
able to being definitely irredeemable. Consistent with Sider's assumption of
degrees of goodness and badness, I assume there are borderline cases of being
irredeemably evil in which it is not true that S is irredeemably evil and not
false that S is irredeemably evil. I do urge that uttering one minor obscenity
can change an agent from being on some borderline of irredeemably evil to
being definitely irredeemably evil. I argue that this too makes an important
and non-arbitrary moral difference for a perfect being that is able to save any
agent that is borderline irredeemable.
18. The assertion is intended to follow directly from the assumption that
some moral states k and k in the sequence of moral states from k to k are
such that an agent that instantiates kni is redeemable and an agent that instan
tiates kmi is irredeemable. Let kni = k . By hypothesis k0 is a moral state such
that an agent S instantiates k0 only if S is redeemable, since moral agents that
instantiate k0 are among the very best relative to the obscenity criterion Sider
adopts. Let kmi = k. By hypothesis k is a moral state such that S instantiates k
only if S is irredeemable, since moral agents that instantiate k are the worst
relative to the obscenity criterion Sider adopts. It might be objected that, for
all we know, every moral agent is redeemable. But, as I mention in note (3)
above, I assume only that there might be irredeemable moral agents. It should
be recalled that Sider also does not claim that all of his assumptions are true.
He does not insist, for instance, that every moral state is instantiated but only
that possibly every moral state is instantiated.
19. I claim here that, possibly, a perfect being is governed by PJ1 and PJ2.
I do not claim that, necessarily, a perfect being is governed by these principles
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(nor, incidentally, do I deny it). We have supposed that an agent S instantiates
an irredeemably evil moral state kni if and only if S is himself irredeemably evil.
Further we have supposed that a moral state kni is irredeemably evil if and
only if kni is sufficiently bad that God cannot save any agent that instantiates kni.
It is impossible, then, that S instantiates an irredeemably evil moral state and
also goes determinately to heaven. So we are claiming that possibly God could
not save S. But aren't there worlds in which (i) God is not governed by PJ1 or
PJ2 and (ii) S is borderline irredeemable and S' is definitely irredeemable and
(iii) God sends S and S' determinately and eternally to hell? I'm inclined to
doubt it, but even if such worlds were possible, they would not be feasible. I
do not assume in this example that God chooses the principles of justice that
govern his choices. I assume that possibly PJ1 and PJ2 are true and in those
worlds they are the principles God applies. I could as well have urged that,
for all we know, these principles hold in every world. Thanks to Tom Flint for
pushing this point, though I suspect he won't find this brief response entirely
satisfying.
20. To avoid additional sources of vagueness, we should add the simplify
ing assumption that no one indefinitely holds up his card.
21. Sider offers a similar objection. See “Hell and Vagueness," op. cit. p.
59.
22. Higher-order vagueness is the result of borderline cases themselves
having borderlines cases. This is perhaps easiest to see with the case of color
properties.
Consider the sequence of grey below.
k2

k1

|--------------- 1--------1-------Not Grey

Grey

For first-order vagueness we have the area k1 that is definitely grey and a
single borderline to the left, k2, that is indefinitely grey. But if we acknowl
edge that there are borderlines cases of our borderline cases, we need to add a
borderline k3 area between k1 and k2. And the sequence becomes more com
plicated.
k2
Not Grey

k3

k1
Grey

For second-order vagueness we have the area k1 that is definitely, definitely
grey, the area k2 that is definitely, indefinitely grey, the area k3 that is indefi
nitely, definitely grey (if k3 is closer in color to k1 than it is to k2) and in
definitely, indefinitely grey (if k3 is closer in color to k2 than it is to k1). But
it is reasonable to believe that every border has a border. If so, then orders
of vagueness go infinitely upward. Suppose you're inclined to believe that
higher orders of vagueness are unlimited for the predicate 'is irredeemably
evil.' This presents no problem for the objection I am advancing against Sider 's
Degree of Goodness Argument, since the existence of higher orders of vague
ness for 'is irredeemably evil' is consistent with there being some agents that
are superdefinitely irredeemably evil. The superdefinitely irredeemably evil
agents are just those agents that are irredeemably evil and on no borderline of
irredeemable evil.
23.
Recall the relation between irredeemably evil moral states and irredeem
ably evil moral agents discussed above (p. 10 ff.). S instantiates an irredeemably
evil moral state kni if and only if S is himself irredeemably evil. And a moral
state kni is irredeemably evil if and only if kni is sufficiently bad that God cannot
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save any agent that instantiates kni. It is impossible, then, that S instantiates an
irredeemably evil moral state and also goes determinately to heaven. Given
the binary conception of the afterlife—that every agent goes determinately to
heaven or goes determinately to hell—a moral agent S is irredeemably evil
only if S goes determinately and eternally to hell.
24. It would be a mistake, I think, to abandon (J') altogether. The exception
to (J') that we have discussed involves a case in which two moral agents in
stantiate almost the same moral state but cannot be treated in almost the same
way. One of the agents is irredeemably evil and so, by hypothesis, cannot be
saved. The other agent is borderline irredeemably evil and so, by hypothe
sis, is not quite beyond salvation. It might be worth considering whether (J')
should be restricted to agents that are in nearly the same moral state and can
be treated in nearly the same way.
25. My gratitude to two referees for this journal and Tom Flint for some
interesting and challenging comments.

